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Abstract
In a two-country model with mobile capital we analyse decentralized social insurance policies.
Decisions made about social insurance are a compromise between the preferences of workers and
capital owners. Due to the rigidity of the labour market in the EC, the substantial social insurance
contributions are borne partly by capital owners. These contributions affect the profitability of
investment, and consequently the direction and size of capital flows. Countries will regard these
effects in determining their level of socíal insurance. Noncooperative decision making between
both countries results in tax competition. Given the characteristics of the labour market, this
implies an underprovision of social insurance. Ai addition, inereasing economic integration,
represented by increasing capital mobility, could imply a divergence of the social insurance levels
in the two countries.
Keywords: economic integration, social insurance policies, capital mobility, tax competition.I
1. Introduction
In the literature to date the effects of decentralized decision making on redistribution in an
economic union have mainly been s[udied in a framework in which labour is mobile.' Although
this is plausible for [he US, labour mobility in the EC is much lower or even negligible.
Therefore, it is often concluded that the process of economic integration in the EC will not affect
the social insurance policies of the member states. And, given the various preferences for
insurance in the member states, there is no need for coordination at the EC level.
This paper will challenge this view. Although the mobility of the production factor labour has
increased negligibly during the process of integration, this does not hold for the factor capital.
Over the last decade, the mobility of capital has increased enormously due to [he introduction of
new financial products, and the liberalization of capital controls, especially in the EC. The size
and direction of capital flows, however, are influenced by social insurance taxes. In spite of the
non-mobility of workers in the EC, capital owners are not able to shift fully the tax contributions
to the former, because of the downward rigidity of the wages. These social insurance
contributions affect the profitability of investments, and could act as an indirect source-based tax
on capital. This effect could be substantial, taking into account the size of social insurance
con[ributions in the EC.'
From the literature,~ it is known that the mobility of capital in combination with a source-based
tax can lead to competition between governments to attract scarce capital, resulting in an
underprovision of (local) public goods. In our context, this could imply that Ihe competition
between countries pushes the level of social insurance below the level that results from
cooperation between these countries. However, because risk-averse workers prefer social
insurance as a means of providing income during spells of joblessness, the social insurance level
will not be pushed down to zero.
'See Pauly (1973), Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991), where the effects on pure
redistribution policies are analysed. In Lejour and Verbon (1993), the effects on social insurance systetns
are considered.
~In 1988 the total social insurance contributions equal 25.79t, of GDP in the EC. 41.99b of these
contributions is paid by employers, 24.1~6 by households, and 28.4T by the government, sce Eurostat
(t991).
3e.g. Wilson (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski ( 1986), Wildasin (1988, 1989), and Bucovetsky and
Wilson (1991).2
In general, workers and capital owners will have opposite views on the desirability of the social
insurance system. Workers prefer a higher level of social insurance than capital owners, although
the difference in the preferred levels is lower if countries do no not coordinate decision making on
social insurance than if they do coordinate. Workers prefer an inefficient low level to prevent
capital owners from investing abroad. On the other hand, just because of the possibility that
foreign investments at home will reduce the return on capital, capital owners prefer an inefficient
high level of social insurance. As a result of these various preferences, the effect of
noncooperative behaviour of the member states is not unambiguous, but crucially depends on the
distribution of political power and the characteristics of the labour market.
This paper uses a two-country model to analyse the issues above. Section two introduces the
analytical framework, examining Ihe relationship between capital mobility and decision making on
social insurance. Capital ownerslemployers and workers both have a say in the policy decisions on
social insurance. That section will also describe the capitat and labour market and Ihe production
sector in both economies. The subsequent section analyses the decision-making process and the
relation between social insurance tax rates and capital mobility. Moreover, we discuss the
different preferences of capital owners and workers. It appears that in our model capital owners
prefer a higher social insurance tax rate in an integrated economy than they would in a
nonintegrated economy, while workers prefer a lower tax rate, although that level is still higher
than the one preferred by capital owners. The Nash-equilibrium is presented in section four. We
compare the results of coordinated and noncoordinated fiscal policy and discuss the causes of tax
competition. In section five the effects of increasing integratíon are examined. It follows that in
the process of integration capital-importing countries reduce the level of social insurance, while
capital-exporting countries raise ít. The last section will briefly discuss some generalizations of the
model and summarize the main results.
2. The social insurance model and capital mobility
Social insurance contributions are an important labour cost factor for employers because workers
try to shift their social insurance contributions on to employers in wage negotiations, while
employers are not able to shift the employer-based taxes to the workers. In our model we simply
assume that workers pay all social insurance contributions, but that a part of these contributions is
passed on to employers through higher wages as a result of wage negotiations. These contributions
are equal to cw for every employed worker, where t represents the social insurance tax rate and3
w the gross wage level. Every worker who becomes jobless as a consequence of illness,
disability, unemployment, or old age receives a benefit, qw, where i1 represents the bertefit rate.
The budget equation of the social insurance system in a country reads'




where N represents the number of employed workers and H-N the number of non employed. It
is assumed that the total number of employed and non employed workers, H, is exogenous and
that the employment level is endogenously determined by profit maximisation. It follows that the
risk of being non employed is endogenous on a macrceconomic level.s Note that the inverse of
the workers-beneficiaries ratio, ~, can be interpreted as the price of the social insurance system.
r
Decisions on social insurance levels are made by politicianslpolicymakers. Because politicians
want to be in office, their (proposed) policies are restricted to maximise their expected plurality in
the coming elections. Using a probabilistic voting model,b Coughlin et aL (1991) have shown that
in such a case the decision-making function has the following form:
D - ~HE(Ut) t (1-!:)KE(U~) (2)
Because politicians embrace policies that maximise the expected utilities of voters in such way that
they vote for them, the decision-making function is a weighted average of the expected utilities of
workers, E(Ut), and employers, E(U~). K indicates the number of employers, and the exogenous
weight !: refers to the relative political influence of workers, which depends, among other factors,
on the bias term of the voters.
All workers have a chance, N, of being employed and a chance, NHN, of being non employed.
The expected utility of a representative worker in a country is equal to
i'o avoid confusion, we do not indicate that the variables in the equations are country-specific. later
on we will use the superscript 1 to refer to country I, etc.
SAlthough the risk of becoming ill or disabled is panly detennined by medical causes, and so from an
economic point of vícw this risk is ezogenous, economic circumstances determine the risk of being non
employed and the effort of employers to attract partially disabled. For the sake of simplici[y, this paper
abstracts from the exogenous risk.
bin a probabilistic voting model, voters will support the party that tnazimises their expected utility,
corrected for an expec[ed utility bias in favour of a party. That bias arises from ideological and other non-
policy-related factors, personal characteristics of the politicians, and the like. This bias term is a random
variable for politicians.4
E(U~) - N U((1 -T)w) ; yNN U(~l w) (3)
It is assumed that workers fully consume their income. U( ) represents the utility of labour or
benefit income. The utility function is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, strictly
concave and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Assume that the employers own capital; from now on they will be referred to as capita) owners.
Capital owners maximise their expected indirect utility, E(U~J, by maximising their return on
capital. In both countries, each capital owner possesses a fixed endowment of one unit, which
cannot be sold. So, the total endowment in country I is equal to K~. In our two-country model
with capital mobility, capital owners can invest their endowment in one or both countries. The
investment decision depends on the marginal products of capital in both countries, which are equal
to the interest rates, r~. A capital owner from country B invests in country A if
(4)
C represents the costs of investing abroad. Persson and Tabellini (1992) call it 'mobili[y costs'.
These costs consist of physical costs of gathering extra information about legal issues or about
marketing, of overcoming country-specific regulations, of hiring foreign employees, and, most
important, of gathering information to judge the profitability of investment possibilities and the
solvency of firms. The fact that this information is not easily obtainable from abroad makes
foreign investors reluctant to invest abroad. So, the elimination of all fotmal restrictions to capital
mobility in the EC is not a sufficient condition for international capital mobility. Molle (1991)
argues that capital markets have to become more transparent by informing investors and creditors
about the quality of financial products to make the liberaliiation of capital markets effective.
It is expected that capital mobility will increase in coming years. According to the White book, a
lot of country-specific rules will be standardized, and the Commission of the EC is working on a
harmonization of company laws. This will have a positive effect on the transparency of capital
markets. We will represent the further integration of capital markets by lowering the parameterC
in our model, as will be done in section five. To simplify the analysis, we consider only capital5
flows from country B to A. 5o capital owners in country A invest their endowment completely in
their own country, while capital owners in country B may choose to invest in both countries.'
Given the initial situation that the difference between the marginal product of capital in country A
and country B outweighs the mobility costs, capital flows to country A, which leads to a decrease
in r" and an increase in rB, due to the changing marginal productivities of capital. We assume
that there exists an interttal equilibrium with a positive capital stock in country B where
r" - rB t C (5)
From this eyuation it follows that the size of the capital stock in country A, K" depends only on
the rate of return in one country, and the mobility costs, K" - K(r",G) .
In both countries Ihere is one consumer good produced, with labour and capital as inputs. The
production function is chazacterised by constant returns to scale, so there aze no profits. The
production function for the economy as a whole reads
F(N,K) - wN t rK
c3F(x) ~ B F-~F(x) ~ o y-x
F~ - ác ~ axay ~ B y mx
x,Y - N, K (6)
The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the detemilnant of the Hessian is equal to
zero, so FXKFNN - FNRFKN - O. We will use this property of the production function in the
succeeding sections. The demand for capital and labour is determined by their prices, so it follows
that
c3F(N, K) FK- aK -r
aF(N,K) FN - aN - w
The total demand of capital in both countries, K" tKe, is equal to the exogenous supply of
(~)
(g)
'We have simply assumed that mobility costs are constant per unit of foreign investment. Persson and
Tabellini (1992) use a more complicated function to model the mobility costs. In the first place they assume
that the mobility costs are convex in the size of the investment abroad. They need this assumption to get an
internal equilibrium because, contrary to our model, the gross rates of retum on capital aze exogenous. In
the second place, their function allows for bidirectional capital Flows. We could also use such a function for
the mobility costs, but that dces not alter the main results.6
capital by the capital owners, K- K" t KB. The rate of return on capital depends on the size of
the investment in both countries.s
The labour markets in the EC are characterised by high and persistent unemployment rates and
real wage rigidity. Layard et aL (1991) provide an overview, arguing that the rigidity in the
labour markets can be largely explained by wage bargaining. In the EC, 75~ of all workers'
wages are covered by collective bargaining, which is mostly decentralized to the firm or industry
level. Layard et al. (1991) provide data and estimation results that support their theory.
Interestingly, from their empirical material follows that an increase in the wedge between gross
and net labour costs of one percent induces an immediate rise of the gross labour costs of one half
percent. Although this effect is not petmanent, it probably has a significant impact on
unemployment for a decade or more. This implies that workers are able to shift taxes, and that
increases in the social insurance tax rates can have long-lasting effects on the gross wage.
Based on these considerations, we represent national labour supply in the EC by a wage-setting
function in our model that can be underpittned by a decentralized wage-bargaining model, see
appendix 1. We will not deal extensively with the derivation of this function, because we are
interested mainly in the wage at the macrceconomic IeveL In our macrceconomic wage-setting
function, social insurance taxes affect the wage level positively. Because higher tax rates reduce
the net wage and increase the benefit, and therefore strengthen the bargaining position of labour
unions, an increase in the tax rate has a positive effect on the wage level. An increase in
employment also strengthens the bargaining position of decentralized unions, because it increases
the probability of having a job outside the firtn, and the benefit rate. It follows that
K, -N,(N,i) wN- á ~p, w~ - á ~0 (9)
Next, we eliminate the unrealistic possibility that higher tax rates have a downward effect on the
gross wage level through the negative effect on employment, and a positive effect on the wage
s71te total mobility costs, C(K"-K"), are paid [o lawyers, consultants, etc., who spend this income
on consumption. They have no influence on the social insurance policy, because they are self-employed, and
have their own private insurance. Secondly, the siu of the group is too small and their interests aze too
heterogenous, to form a relevant interest group in the decision-making process on social insurance.level by assuming that 0 ~ d - wr t wN~ ~ t-~ .' Note that if wages aze fuily flexible, there is
full employment: the risk of being non employed, therefore, consists only of the exogenous risk.
In that case, social insurance taxes aze completely borne by workers, and do not affect the
economy. Then the whole model fades away.
3. The level of social ussurance: a partial equilibrium analysis
With the model that is presented in the last section, we are able to examine the effects of capital
market integration on the level of social insurance. This section will derive the optimal social
insurance tax rate for one country, and compaze it with the tax rate that results if capital is
immobile. The analysis of the Nash-equilibrium, and the comparison with the cooperative
equilibrium are carried out in the next section.
In studying fiscal equilibria in two-cottntry models, it is quite natural to assume that
noncooperative policymakers take the fiscal decisions of the other country as given (see Mintz and
Tulkens (1986) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991)). These fiscal equilibria aze chazacterised as Nash-
equilibria. In addition, the fiscal decisions of the policymakers affect the private sector at home
and abroad. It is assumed that policymakers take these effects into account in optimising the
decision-making function, while the private agents take the announced policy decisions as
given.'o
Taking all information about the private sector into account, policymakers maximise a decision-
making function, given Ihe budget restriction, the equilibrium condition on the capital market in
the integrated economies, the equilibrium condition for the capital flow between the countries, the
demand for capital and labour in both countries, and the wage-setting functions." After
substitution of the budget restriction, and the wage-setting functioas in the other equations, the
decision-making function, D- D(c,N,r), is differentiated with respect to the tax rate, taking into
account the effects on the other vaziables, ~ and ~.
slf the wage-setting function is founded on the wage-bazgaining model indicated in appendix 1, the first
inequality is always satisfied, while the second one is satisfied with some weak conditions on some
parameters.
~oof course policymakers have the possibility to deviate from the announced policy. l3ecause this
problem is beyond the scope of our paper, we simply assume that it is not profi[able for them to deviate.
~'That is to say, they maximise equation (2), given (I), K- K" tKB, (5), (7), (R), and (9).s
These derivatives can be obtained by differentiating the economic sub-model with respect to all
endogenous variables. This exercise is carried out in appendix 2. An increase in the taz rate raises
labour costs. Therefore employment is reduced, which has a negative effect on the marginal
productivity of capital. So, the demand of capital is decreased, which in turn lowers the marginal
productivity of labouc Employment is further reduced, until the marginal productivity of labour
equals the gross wage. The decrease in the capital stock also exerts upward pressure on the
marginal productivity of capital, but that does not offset the downward pressure caused by the
decrease in employment. In the new equilibrium the employment level, the capital stock, and the
return on capítal are lowered. So, ~ a dF ~ 0.
dr ' d. ' ds
The first-order condition of the maximisation problem is equal to
dD dE(U~) dE(U~) d~y dE(U~) dr
Z- dt -~H dc }~H dN dt }(1-E)K
dr dr - 0 (10)
Hdá~~'~ represents the direct effects of a change of the tax rate on the expected utility of workers,
which is positive if the social insurance system is assumed to be incentive-compatible
~2 dE(U~ dN ( q s 1-t ). HáN ~ represents the indirect effects through the change in the etnployment level
on the expected utility of workers. These indirect effects consist of Ihe change in the risk of being
non employed, the gross wage level and the price of the social insurance system. If the social
insurance system is incentive-compatible, HdaN'~ has a positive sign. So, in determining their
preferred social insurance tax rate, workers have to trade off the direct effect of a change in the
taz rate on the net wage and benefit against the indirect effects through the ittduced change in
employment. For capital owners, an increase in ttte tax rate always implies a loss in expected
utility, through the negative effect on the marginal productivity of capital ( d~u`~ ~ 0). Obviously,
their preferred tax rate is equal to zcro.
In equilibrium the positive social insurance [ax rate is lower than the one preferred by the
workers. As a result, an increase in the relative political influence of the workers will have an
upward effect on the tax rate, while an increase in the relative influence of the capital owners will
have the opposite effect. Notice that a higher tax rate implies a higher benefit level, and therefore
a higher level of social insurance. [n general a change in the tax rate leads to an opposite effect in
~ZDue to the formulation of the mazimisation problem, incentive compatibility is not guaranteed. Given
the fact that in practice all social insurancc systems are incentive compatible it is assumed that any solution
of the maximisation problem will satisfy this characteristic.9
the employment level, and therefore the effect on the benefit level is not immediately clear.
However, in equilibrium the marginal benefit of a change in the tax rate is higher than the
marginal cost for the workers. Given the fact that the effect on their net wage is negative, it
follows that the effect on the benefit has to be positive. So, the direct effect of a change in the tax
rate on the benefit level dominates the indirec[ effect through a change in the employment level in
equilibrium."
We are interested in the effects of international capital mobility on the level of social insurance.
Therefore we compare this situation with one in which capital is not mobile, and is completely
invested in the home country. This is labelled as the nonmobility case. We make the comparison
with capital mobility at the point that there is no foreign investment, so that Kr-Kf in both
countries. The size of the capital stock and the employment level are the same in both cases. The
influence of capital mobility appears from the derivatives of employment and the interest rate with
respect to the tax rate, denoted by ~T and ~~, which are presented in appendix 2. For the
nortmobility case, ~" and ~", can be derived in a similaz way.
The effect of capital mobility on the tax ra[e is analysed by evaluating the first derivative of the
decision-making function, at the point where capital is not mobile. In fact, we substitute the first-
order condition for [he case in which capital is not mobile in equation (10). The effect of capital
mobility follows from the sign of the expression below:
dE(U) 8N~ c3Nn c7E(U~) j arT dr"l
Vm - Z~ - Z" - EH t f- - ~ f(1-E)H I- - I
óN l c3t dc ` ar l dz ai 1
In particular, if VT ~ 0, policymakers decide on a lower tax rate for the case in which capital
has become mobile. The first term on the right-hand side is negative. It is in the interest of
workers to lower the tax rate if capital becomes mobile, because the negative effect of an increase
in the tax rate on employment will increase. If capital is mobile, capital will flow away, due to the
lower marginal productivity of capital. This results in a lower employment level. Since this effect
dces not exist in the nonmobility case, the absolute value of ~" is smaller. The second term is
positive. With the introduction of capital mobility, capital owners get better opportunities to
invest, thereby increasing the return on investment. The marginal costs of an increase in the tax
'}Because it follows from this analysis that the level of the taz rate and benefit c6ange in the same
direction, we will only discuss changes ín the taz-rate levels in the nezt sections.10
rate decrease, because taxes can be escaped by investing abroad. Although capital owners still
prefer no scxial insurance system, their opposition against the system is reduced."
From looking at the preferences of workers and capital owners, we can thus conclude that with
the introduction of capital mobility the conflict between workers and capital owners is diminished.
The total effect of capital mobility on the tax rate is basically determined by the strength of the tax
effects on the utility of workers and capital owners. However, these effects are related via the
first-order condition. Taking this relation into account, appendix 3 demonstrates that
V~ ~ Q tf HE~ -(H-MEN ~ O Ei -
aw ~ EN - ar N
(12)
ds w dN w
lnterestingly, the effect of introducing capital mobility depends on the characteristics of the wage-
setting function. The degree of tax shifting, reftected by the elasticity ew, should be relatively
high compared with the product of the unemployment rate times the effect of employment on
wages, eN. [n other words, if the decrease in gross wages engendered by the lower tax rate is not
fully offset by the positive employment effects on the gross wage, policymakers will set a lower
tax rate. This result is not sutprising because the most itnportant effect of capital mobility is the
change in the employment level. In order to avoid an increase in the unetnployment rate, workers
will vote for measures aimed at that policy goal, such as a decrease in the taz rate. As noted
before, the wage- bargaining model has not been made explicit in the paper. However, the well-
known wage-bargaining model alluded to in appendix l, appears to generate the condition in
equation (12) as a result. This condition seems to hold more or less generally, and we will
consider its fulfilment as our benchmark case. So, the introduction of capital mobility implies a
downward pressure on the social insurance level.
4. The noncoordinated and coordinated equilibrium
4.1 The noncoordinated equilibrium
Thus far, we have studied only the optimal tax rate of one country given the foreign tax rate. In
[his section the fiscal Nash-equilibrium will be analysed. It will be compazed with the coordinated
equilibrium to consider the question whether the member states use the social insurance tax
'i'his result seems to be surprising because, especially in the notthem member states of the EC,
employers argue that the level of social insurance must be lowered, due to the economic integration.
However, the arguments of the employers are based mainly on the idea that European integration increases
competition between the firms on the consumer goods market. This issue is examined in Lejour (1993).lI
strategically to inFluence the capital flows. Such strategic behaviour of the member states could
lead to an underprovision of socia(insurance.
First, we analyse the reactions of policymakers to changes in the foreign tax rate. Because the
home tax rate can not be written explicitly as a function of the foreign tax rate, we differentiate
[he first-order condition to obtain the slopes of the reaction curves. As a result
~rdt! t ~rdi~ - 0
dZf - aZt aNr ~ azr arf
dr~ dr~ di~ aN~ ai~ ar~ ar~
I s J I,J - A,B (13)
Equation (13) describes the reaction of the tax rate to a change of the foreign tax rate. ~~
dc~
represents the second-order condition of maximisation of the policy function. It is assumed to be
r
negative. ~ indicates the effect of a change of the foreign tax rate on the marginal utility with
di~
respect to the home tax rate. This effect on the home country is induced by the change in the
capital flow, which has an effect on employment and the marginal productivity of capital. The
algebraic derivation of equation (13) is given in appendix 4. In this derivation the elasticities
es -~`, x- N,w,r and EN are used, which are assumed to be constant. These effects will
a~ x
now be discussed in more detail.
The effect of employment on marginal (political) welfare consists of several elemetus. First, an
increase in employment decreases the probability of being non employed, which implies that the
negative effect of an increase in the tax rate on the net wage will receive a lazger weight. As a
consequence, the demand for social insurance expressed by the workers will decrease. Second, the
wage is raised due to an increase in employment and, given the characteristics of the utility
function, the need for insurance is diminished. On the other hand, an increase in employment
decreases the price of the social insurance system as measured by ~. For any value of the tax rate
r
the benefit rate will be higher. This substitution effect provides an incentive to raise the tax rate.
The totai effect of a change in the employment level on the marginal value of the policy function
to the tax rate is negative if the income effect dominates the substitution effect, so 1-o ~ 0 with
o-- ~u-~'~ . Because an increase in the foreign tax rate stimulates employment, the workers need
u~cs~
less insurance.
~~ represents the effect of the rnarginal productivity of capital to the mazginal welfare. In
a,
appendix 4 it is shown that a decrease in the mazginal productivity of capital lowers the tnarginal
cost of taxes, if 1- o ~ 0. Because an increase in the foreign tax rate exerts downward pressurelz
on the marginal productivity of capital, capital owners will apply pressure to lower the home tax
rate.
From the analysis above it follows that workers and capital owners demand Iess social insurance if
~
the foreign tax rate is increased, ~ ~ 0, if 1 - o ~ 0. The reaction functions of bo[h countries
d1
have a negative slope in that case. As discussed in section 3, the policymakers of both countries
decide on a lower tax rate if capital becomes mobile in the benchmark case. It thus follows that
the social insurance tax rates in the fiscal Nash-equilibrium will be lower than in the nonmobility
case.'s
4.2 The coordinated equilibrium
As is well known, noncooperative behaviour under the Nash-equilibrium is not efficient due to the
external effects of decision making. Member states in general do not take into account the
beneficial or harmful effects that impact the other member states due to the increase of their own
tax rate.'" These fiscal externalities could be corrected if the countries would coordinate decision
making on social insurance. By the tertn `coordination' we mean to imply the situation in which
countries decide autonomously on the level of social insurance taking into account the exterttal
effects on the other countries. This issue is especially relevant for the situation in the EC. Given
the absence of a central authority, the externalities can be internalized only if the countries
voluntarily coordinate their decisions. So, coordination must be 'welfare' improving for all
countries involved. For an individual country, coordination is strictly welfare improving if
r aE(Utf) f aE(Utt) dNt 1 c3Nr ~ aE(U~) c3r1 r arr ~ 14 dD -!; dr t!: dt t-dr t(1-{) dr i-dt ~ 0( )
dtr dNr [ dtr ázJ c7rt dtr as~ ,
If this expression is evaluated at the Nash-equilibrium, it follows that a country wants to
coordinate decision making if it holds that
f r f r
dDf -~~ aE(Ut) dN t(1-~)
aE(U~) ar di~ ~ 0 I s J, I,J - A,B
3N r at~ c3r t ar~
(15)
'sWe will assume that the Nash-equilibrium is unique. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove this for
all parameter values.
16For a more de[ailed analysis of [he fiscal eztemalities that arise in an ewnomy with decentralized
fiscal decision-making with mobile capital, see Wildasin (1989).l3
As before, workers and capital owners have different ideas aboutthe desired change in the foreign
tax rate." Workers prefer an increase in the foreign tax rate because that attracts capital and
stimulates employment in their country, while capital ownets prefer a decrease because that
improves their opportunities abroad. As in the previous section, we substitute ~ and ~, and the
first-order condition in the equation above. In a similar way as described in appendix 3 it follows
that
dDf ~ 0 if HE~ -(H-N)EN ~ 0 (16)
dt~
This is the same condition as in equation (12). Provided that the wage-setting function entails this
condition, member states aze willing to coordinate their decisions if the other member state is
willing to raise the social insurance rate. An increase in the foreign taz rate would stimulate
employment. Because the ensuing upwatd pressure on wages is relatively modest, the increase in
employment can be substantial, partly offsetting the decrease in the marginal productivity of
capital due to the extra inflow of capital.
Given that coordination implies gains for the member states, let us suppose that they agree to
coordinate their decisions by acting `as if [hey maximise the following policy function:
D~~ - D" t DB I- A,B (17)
It is of interest to consider in which direction the tax rates change compared to the Nash-
equilibrium. Taking the derivative of this modified policy function and evaluating it in the Nash-
equilibrium (see equation (10)), it follows that
dDJ~ aE(Ut~) dN~ dE(U~) dr~ Zt~ - - - !: t (1-~) - ! k J I,J - A,B
dtf dNf dt~ dr~ dtr
Using the same procedure as in equation (l2), we derive that equation (lg) has a positive sign if
HE~ -(H-l~EN ~ 0. The upshot of this is that the social insurance tax rates aze higher in the
coordinated equilibrium than they are in the Nash-equilibrium. In the Nash case, the policymakers
of both countries use the tax rate to attract capital and do not take into account the negative
'welfare effect' on the other country. We obtain here the familiar result in fiscal federalism that
"The signs of the derivatives above are determined in section 3 and appendix 2.14
when countries do not coordinate decision making, tax competition will arise. Notmally, tax
competition is defined as the case where countries compete to attract the mobile good by
manipulating the tax rate on that good (see Wildasin (1988)). Interestingly, in this case the relation
between the tax rate (on labour) and the mobile good (capital) is indirect. The result is based on
the link between the capital market and the distorted labour mazket. In the first place the size of
the capital stock determines partly the employment level and therefore the tax base of the social
insurance system. In the second place, the level of the tax rate influences through the labour costs
the return on capital. Consequently, also in this case a change in the tax rate distorts the tax base
through the induced mobility effects.'s In fact, due to the rigidity on the labour market the social
insurance tax rate is an indirect source-based tax on capital.
5. The effects of increasing capital mobility
Since European integration is an ongoing process, i[ is important to analyse the consequences of
removing the remaining barriers to capital mobility, and the initiatives of the Commission of EC
to make capital markets more transparent for foreign investors. The measures in this area can be
represented in the model by lowering the mobility costs. Such changes in costs can be due to
several policy measures, for example by lifting or standardizing country-specific rules that restrict
the mobility of capital, as the harmonization of company laws, or by starting campaigns to inforrn
potential foreign investors about investment policies.'~
We consider the effect of a change in the mobility costs on the social insurance tax rate in one
country. This effect can be analysed by differentiating the first-order condition, equation (13), and
the economic sub-model with respect to all the endogenous variables and the mobility costs, given
the foreign tax rate. Also in this case the elasticities are assumed to be constant.
18Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) derive the same sort of result. In analysing tax competition they
conclude from their model that jurisdictions use a lump-sum tax on wage income as an instrument to attract
capítal.
191t is assumed that the reduction of the mobiliry costs is part of an agreement between the member
states to complete the intemal market. It is expected that this agreement is beneficial to all member states
involved, although the reduction of tnobility costs in itself is not necessarily beneficial to all member states.
In particular, there is a negative welfare effect of lower mobility costs for the capital exporting country in
the benchmark case.15
dZ'drf t dZf dC - 0
dr' dC
dZ' dZ' dNf dZ' dr'
- - t--
dC d~yr dC dr~ dC
I - A,B (19)
~~ represents the total effect of a change in the mobility costs on the marginal utility with respect ec
to the tax rate. As in the previous section, this total effect is induced by the change in the capital
Flow, which affects the employment level and the marginal productivity of capital.
If the incentives to invest abroad are increased, the capital owners of country B would increase
their investments in country A. Employment in the capital-importing country would be stimulated,
while the marginal productivity of capital would be reduced by the increased competition on the
capital market. In the capital exporting-country opposite forces are at work. Due to the outflow of
capital, employment would be reduced and the retum on investment increased. More formally,
arN ~ 0 a'~ ~ 0 aNs ~ 0 and a-~ ~ 0(see appendix 2 for the derivation). Given the signs of
ac ac ac ac
the other derivatives, explained in section 4, it follows that ~~ ~ 0 and ~ ~ 0. These signs
imply that lower mobility costs have a downward (upward) effect on the tnarginal value of the
policy function with respect to the tax rate in the capital-importing (exporting) country.
If the absulute value of the slope of the reaction curve of country A is larger than the one of
country B,~ it follows that not only in the partial equilibria, but also in the fiscal Nash-
equilibrium ~, ~ 0 and á~ ~ 0. The policymakers in the capital-importing member state lower
the social insurance rate if the mobility costs are lowered, while in the capital-exporting country
the tax rate would be raised. As can be seen in figure 1, a decrease in mobility costs shifts the
reaction curve of country A and B to the left and above, respectively. Due to the change in
employment and the interest rate, workers and capital owners in the capital-importing country are
less willing to pay social insurance contributions, while both groups in the capital exporting
country want to raise social insurance contributions in comparison with the old equilibrium, Eo.
(insert figure l)
Notice that as the direction of the change of the tax rate and of the benefit level are always the
same, as is argued earlier, the benefit level in the capital-importing (exporting) country is
decreased (increased). Whether this implies a convergence or a divergence of the social insurance
mIn a dynamic setting, this would imply that the equilibrium is stable.16
systems in both countries depends on the initial situation. If the attractiveness of the capital-
importing country for investors is based on the lower level of social insurance, increasing
integration will imply a divergence of the level of social insurance between capital-importing and
capital-exporting countries.
A reduction in the mobility costs also has an asymmetric effect on the externalities of
noncoordinated behaviour of the member states. This can be seen by differentiating dZ~ (see
ar
equation (I8)) to the mobility costs, in which the constant elasticities EN~ -~ N~ and
a.~ ~~ e~ - di r are substi[uted. It follows that an increase of the social ínsurance tax rate of country
A, the capital- importing country, has a larger effect on the welfare in country B as the mobility
costs are reduced given that 1-0 ~ 0. In an opposite way, an increase in the tax rate of country
B has smaller effects on the welfare of country A. So, the capital-exporting country seems to face
more harmful effects from tax competition if the integration process ptoceeds than does the
capital- importing country. This result can be explained by the upward effect on the rate of return
on capital and the downward effect on the employment level in country B due to a reduction in
mobility costs. This implies that the marginal costs of an increase in the foreign tax rate are
lowered while the marginal benefits are raised. So, for workers and capital owners of the capital-
exporting country, an increase in the foreign tax rate is more beneficial if the mobility costs are
reduced. The opposite effects in the capital-importing country can be explained by similar
reasoning.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered the effect of capital mobility on decision making concerning
social insurance systems in an integrated market. It was assumed that social insurance is financed
by worker-based taxes that can be partly shifted to employers. The existence of a social insurance
system, then, affects the level of employment and, through adaption of the capital-labour ratio, the
rate of return on capital. Changes in the rates of return incite a capital Flow between the member
countries.
Decisions about the tax rate or, which amount to the same thing, the benefit rate were represented
as a compromise between employerslcapital owners and workers. Whether or not capital is
mobile, workers want a higher benefit rate than do capital owners. However, the difference in the
preferred level diminishes if capital is mobile. The reason for this is that workers want to reducethe tax rate to attract capital with the aim of stimulating employment, while, on the other hand,
the effects of the tax rate on rate of return on capital are less severe now, because capital owners
have obtained the opportunity to invest abroad. In a two-country model where the policymakers of
both countries take the other tax rate as given, the equilibrium tax rates are below the levels that
prevail in the nonmobility case, given the characteristics of the labour market. These
characteristics are satisfied if the wage-setting function is based on a general wage-bargaining
model, which we assumed to hold in our benchmark case.
As is well-known, autonomous decision making creates external effects for other countries in the
integrated market. In our model the externalities consist of the effects of the tax rate in one
country on the employment level and the marginal product of capital in other countries. The
nature of the externality differs for both distinguished groups. If the tax rate is increased, the
employment level in the other countries will increase but the rate of return on capital in the other
countries will decrease. In other words, the workers gain but the capital owners in the other
country lose as a consequence of the increased tax rate. In our benchmark case coordination of
decision making does protect the level of social insurance against social dumping.
Increasing economic integration leading to more capital mobility will have a downward effect on
the tax rate in the capital-importing country and an upward effect in the capital-exporting country.
If the capital-importing countries are also the ones with the lowest level of social insurance, as is
the case for the southern member states of the EC, increasíng economic integration could imply a
divergence of social insurance systems in the member states. Furthermore, capital-importing
countries have less reason to coordinate social insurance policies, because their benefits from the
coordination of social insurance policies are inversely related to the ptogress of the integration
process.
Of course, if one looks beyond the scope of the model other factors come into play. Capital
import could have a positive effect on economic growth, thereby stimulating the development of
the social insurance systems in these countries. Second, the political willingness of the capital-
importing countries to coordinate social insurance policies could be increased with some package
deals. Both elements can (partly) offset the divergence of social insurance systems that is induced
by the continued process of integrating the capital markets in the EC.18
In the economic literature to date political factors have predominantiy been neglected as
determinants of policies in an integrated market (for an exception, see Persson and Tabellini
(1992)). However, this paper has elucidated the importance of politics for the effects of capital
mobility and onguing economic integration. In particular, Ihe dis[ribution of politiutl power
influences the size of [he changes in the tax rate heavily, and is therefore a detennining factor for
the importvtce of tax competition.
It can be noted here that the conflicting interests between workers and capital owners as
represented in equation (2) is not the only interpretation of our model. More generally, we
described the interests of the owners of a mobile endowment, and of an immobile endowment in
social insurance policies. In particular, the owners of the immobile endowment have an interest in
policies that attract the mobile endowment, while the owners of the mobile endowment want to
prevent crowding, given the properties of the production function. This implies that the owners of
the immobile endowment want to restrict the social insurance system, and that the owners of the
mobile endowment want less restrictions compared to the case that both endowments are
immobile.
Using the assumption that only employers own the mobile endowment capital, and workers the
immobile endowment labour, we emphasised the political conflict between employers and
workers. It is possible to argue that this conflict is less severe in particular, if employers cannot
move their fixed physical capital to other countries21 and, secondly, if workers save a part of
their income and have access to the international capital market, through e.g. pension funds.~
In line with the traditional literature on tax competition we kept the supply of capital fixed. Two-
period models can be used in which the supply of capital can be endogenised, as in the two-
country models of Buiter and Kletzer (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1992), and Serensen (1991).
With an endogenous supply of capital, a reduction in the mobility costs increases the effective
interest rate in the capital-exporting country, thus stimulating the supply of capital in that country,
if the elastícity of savings with respect to the interest rate is positive. On the other hand, the extra
'~This is another reason, in addition to the one mentioned in footnote 15, why employers plea for a
lower level of social insurance in an integrated market.
~If individuals own a mobile and an itrurtobile endowtrtent, the composition of their income is also a
determining element in the decision-making process. In a median voter model, where individuals have
different ratíos of capital income to labour income, analogous results can be obtained as here, where this
ratio has the satne role as the politícal power in our model.19
inflow of capital and its concomitant depressing effect on the marginal productivity of capital
reduces the supply in the capital-importing country. Although the quantitative results will change,
the direction of the change in employment and the marginal productivity of capital will be the
same as with a given endowment of capital. As a consequence, it is not to be expected that any of
our qualitative results will change if the supply of capital is endogenised.
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Appendix 1: the underpinning of the wage-setting funMion
We give in this appendix an underpinning for the wage-setting function that is presented in equation (9). The
underlying model is based on Layard et al. (1991). For details we refer to their book. A wage-setting
function with the chazacteristics tnentioned in equation (9) can be derived with a decentralized wage-
bazgaining model of the following type:
A - (L~(E(U~) - E(UJ)aE(U~) (AI.1)
F.quation (A1.1) is a Nash-bargaining function that will be maximised to derive the optimal wage rate. [n
this function L~ represents the number of union members in firm i, and Q the relative bargaining power of
the labour union. The expected utili[y of an union member is:
E(U~ - L~U((1-r)w) t L'-L~E(UJ
L~ L~
The expected utility to work outside the firm or to receive a benefit is equal to
(A1.2)
E(U~ - HU((1-t)w,) . HNU(rywa) (A1.3)
wa represents the average wage rate. This expected utility is also assumed to be the threatpoint of the union
members. The utility of capital owners in their thteatpoint is assumed to be zero. From differentiating this
function to the wage rate, and aggregating over all firms, it follows that the average wage depends on the
employment level, the tax rate, and the benefitlevel. The utility functionis specified as U(s) -(z ~'" -x~~(1-0)
and the production function as a Cobb-Douglas function. The constant in the utility function is necessary to
guarantee a positive amount of u[ility; without the constant, the wage rate could be elimina[ed from the
wage-setting function, because of the proportionality of the benefit level with the wage level. This
characteristic is not tmcommon for wage-setting functions derived fmm bargaining (sce L.ayard et al.).
Given the specifications for the utiliry and production function, the average wage rate is equal to








a is the labour income share in national income, and ao is the positive constant in the utility function of
capital owners. The signs of w~ and wN can be derived by differentiating equa[ion (A1.4) to both variables.
Appendix 2: the determination of the partial derivatives of the ernnomic sub-model
In this appendiz we derive the effects of changes in the home and foreign tax rate, and in the mobili[y costs
on the employment level, marginal productivity of capital, and the capital stock. The differential eqttations
of the economic sub-model arezz
FKNdN~ t FXXdK~ - drt 1- A,B
F~v~vdNf ' FNXdK~ - wNdN~ ~ w~dTt I- A,B
dr" - dr e . dC





The subscripts refer to the first and second-order derivatives of the production and wage-setting function.
We carry out the following substitution steps: first, substitute dNe from equation (A2.2) in (A2.1); second,
substitute dKe from equation (A2.4) in the modified equation (A2.1); third, substitute dr" and dre from
the modified equation (A2.1) in (A2.3); and, fourth, substitute dK" from the modified equation (A2.3) in
(A2.2). It follows that
(FNNXetwN(FXK-X 11dN" - (Xe-FrX)w. dT" ' FNXYedtg ' FNXdC (A2.5)
e e e s
Xe L F~wN i 0 Ye ~ FNXw~ c 0 (A2.tí)
s e e e
F,~,A, -wN F~, - wN
In equation (A2.5) the ezpression preceding dN" has a negazive sign and the expression preceding dc" a
positive one. Hence, ~~ c 0. From this equation it also follows that ~~ ~ 0 and ~~ c 0. In the same ~" ~r x
way we can derive for wuntry B: ~~ c 0, ~~ 0 and ~e ~ 0.
To determine the partial derivatives of the marginal productiviry of capital we use the same substitution
steps as before, supplied witó the substitution of dK" in equation (A2.1). This gives us a relation between
dr" and dN". If equation (A2.5) is substituted in this relation, it follows that
~FNNXB ' wN(FXr"X l~dr" - FXNXBw~dT" ' wHFcX [YBdte ' dC] (A2.7)
So ~ c 0, ~~ c 0 and ~~ 0. In the same way it follows that ~~ c 0, ~ c 0 and ~ c 0. Note
that in the nonmobility case the economic sub-model ronsists of the equations (A2.1) and (A2.2) with
dK - 0. For both countries it follows that, ceteris paribus, without capital mobili[y the absolute values of
~
~~ and ~~ are smaller and larger, respectively.
The partial derivatives of the capital stock follow by substitution of equation (A2.5) in the modified equation
(A2.3) (sce the third substitution s[ep).
" e
~FNNXe~ wN (F~- X~1dK" - F~,w~dt" t wN ' FNX t F~ X s[Yedre t dC]
u
(A2.8)
ar~ c dX" ~ dX" ~r c 0, az~ ~ 0 and dK~ ~ 0. So ~~ 0, ~~ 0 and ~ c 0. In the same way: ~~ ~ ~23
Appendix 3: the sign of equation (l2) and (16)
In Ihis appendix wc give more details about deriving the sign in equation (l2) and (l6). At first ~~ and
b" from appendiz 2 are substitutcd in equation (ll). !f the relation betwcen these two derivatives is used, a~
this equation can be written as
V~ - -FKKWN IEHdE(U~ dN" FNN t(]-E)KdE(U~ dr"
(FNNX~`wN(Fxa-X~)Il dN ds wN dr dr
(A3.1)
The expression preceding the brackets has a negative sign. So, we have to determine only the sign of the
term in brackets. Second, after substitution of the firs[-order condition in the nonmobility case in equation
(A3.1) in order to eliminate the marginal utility of employets, it follows that
dE(U[) dN" FNN dE(U[)
Vw - Ey[ dN dc ( wN - l) dr
(A3.2)
Third, substitution of ~" reduces ~"I w-
IJ
to ~-' . If the derivatives of the ezpected utility of workers
with respect to employment and the taz1rate are written out, the term in brackets becomes
(U((1-t)w) - U(tYw))w` ~ NwU'((1-r)w) ~(N-MYwI N(H~ - 1IU'(cYw) (A3.3)
N l J
Define the elasticities E; -~y and EN -~ w. Then it is easy [o see that if H Nc - t~ 0 equation
(A3.3) has a positive sign. In that case V" ~ 0. Note that this is a sufficient condition. "
Appendix 4: the sign of the secondorder derivetives in equation (13) and (19)
In section 4 and 5 we need the derivatives of the firstorder wndition with respect to employment and the
interest ra[e. Before this is carried out, the first-order condition, equation (10), is rewritten. The ezpected
utilitiesofworkers and capital owners are substituted in thatequation and theelasticities E; -~ ~, x- N,w,r
and EN arc used.
Z- EIU((l-t)w)-U(TYW))NE~ t E(l-i)WN~-; T tEWtENE~~U'((l-S)W) t
E(H-MiYw'I t N NE"~E~ tENE,")U'(cYw) ~(1-E)KrE~U'(r) - U
(A4.1)




(1-{)Ke;U'(r)(1-o) ~ 0 (A4.2)
The second derivative is more complicated. After differentiation of the firstorder condition to the
employment Icvcl, some manipulations are needed for the derivation of [he sign. At first, some terms can be
eliminated. Second, given that the utility functions are of the CRRA type with o-'U-ut some firstorder
~'tsi '
derivatives of the utility function can be written as utility functions. Now it is possible to substitute the first-
order condition times (1 teN(1-o))~N in this equatíon. As a result
dZ -EHZYw(1tH e"'e.'eNEN)UYtYw)rr -(1-E)K7E~U'(r)(1feN(1-o)) (A4.3)
dN - N N-N N
Using the firstorder condition it is easy to show that the condition 1-o ~ 0 is sufficient to guarantee that
equation (A4.3) has a negative sign.
Given thc wage-bargaining function that is indicated in footnote 9, the elasticities are in fact not constant.
This is, however, not necessarily a problem. By assuming cons[ant elasticities we only intended to say tha[
we assume that the effects of changes in the foreign taa rate and mobility costs on the elasticities do not
change the qualitative results that we derived with constant elasticities. In case the production and wage-
setting function are specified as Cobb-Douglas functions we have proved that taking into accoun[ differenti-
ation of the elasticities did not change the qualitative results.Figure 1. Nash equilibrium and increasing capital mobility
Ea: equilibrium with dC - 0
E~ : equilibrium with dC ~ 0
T~A T~A ~Discussion Paper Series, CeotER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
(For previous papers please consult previous discussion papers.)
No. Author(s)
9239 H. Blcemen
9240 F. Drost and
Th. Nijman
9241 R. Gilles, P. Ruys
and 1. Shou
9242 P. Kort
9243 A.L. Bovenberg and
F. van der Plceg
9244 W.G. Gale and
J.K. Scholz










9251 S. Eijffinger and
E. Schaling




9301 N. Kahana and
S. Nitzan
Title
A Model of Labour Supply with Job Offer Restrictions
Temporal Aggregation of GARCH Processes
Coalition Formation in Large Network Economies
The Effects of Mazketable Pollution Permits on the Firm's
Optimal Investment Policies
Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market
in a Second-Best World
IRAs and Household Saving
Robust Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Using
Score Function
The Long Memory and Variability of Inflation: A
Reappraisal of the Friedman Hypothesis
A Generalized Method of Moments Estimator for Long-
Memory Processes
Partisanship as Information
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Accounts
Job Search Theory, Labour Supply and Unemployment Duration
Central Bank Independence: Searching for the Philosophers'
Stone
Environmental Taxation and Labor-Market Distortions
Perrnanent Income, Current Income and Consumption: Evidence
from Panel Data
Imperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia in the
European Monetary System
Credibility and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent
of Rent DissipationNo. Author(s)
9302 W. Giith and
S. Nitzan




9306 B. Peleg and
S. Tijs
9307 G. Imbens and
A. l,ancaster
9308 T. Ellingsen and
K. Warneryd
9309 H. Bester
9310 T. Callan and
A. van Scest
9311 M. Pradhan and
A. van Scest





9315 F. C. Drost and





9318 M.J.G. van Eijs
9319 S. Hurkens
9320 1.J.G. Lemmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger
9321 A.L. Bovenberg and
S. Smulders
Title
Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?
Some Peculiarities ofGroup Decision Making in Teams
Euler Equations in Micro Data: Merging Datafrom Two Samples
A Simple Justification of Quantity Competition and the Coumot-
Oligopoly Solution
The Consistency Principle For Games in Strategic Form
Case Control Studies with Contaminated Controls
Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of
Protection
Price Commitment in Search Markets
Female Labour Supply in Farm Households: Farm and
Off-Fatm Participation
Formal and Infortnal Sector Employment in Urban Areas of
Bolivia
Marginalization and Contemporaneous Aggregation in
Multivariate GARCH Processes
Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability
Consumption over the Life Cycle and over the Business
Cycle
A Note on Robinson's Test of Independence
On Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations
with Ready Times
On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review
On the Determination of the Control Parameters of the Optimal
Can-order Policy
Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Buming Money
The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration: The
Feldstein-Horioka Criterion Revisited
Environmental Quality and Pollution-saving Technological















9332 V. Feltkamp, A. Koster,
A. van den Nouweland,
P. Bortn and S. Tijs
9333 B. Lauterbach and
U. Ben-Zion
9334 B. Melenberg and
A. van Scest
9335 A.L. Bovenberg and




9339 W. Guth and H. Kliemt
9340 T.C. To
9341 A. Demirgu~-Kunt and
H. Huizinga
Title
The Will to Save Money: an Essay on Economic Psychology
The (2"'m" - 2}Ray Algorithm: A New Variable Dimension
Simplicial Algorithm For Computing Economic Equilibria on
S" x Rm
The Financing and Taxation of U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad
Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence
Infant Industry Protection with Leaming-by-Doing
Bankruptcy Litigation and Optimal Debt Contracts
Tariffs, Rent Extraction and Manipulation of Competition
A Comparison of the Cost of Trading French Shares on the
Paris I~oursc and un SI;A(1 Inlernational
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Accounts
Time Preference and Intetnational Tax Competition
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and
Technology
Panic Behavior and the Performance of Circuit Breakers:
Empirical Evidence
Semi-parametric Estimation of the Sample Selection Model
Green Policies and Public Finance in a Small Open Economy
On the Economic Independence of the Central Bank and the
Persistence of Inflation
Characterizations ofa Game Theoretical Cost Allocation
Method
Provision of Public Goods With Incomplete Infortnation:
Decentralization vs. Central Planning
Competition or Co-operation
Export Subsidies and Oligopoly with Switching Costs
Barriers to Portfolio Investments in Emerging Stock MarketsNo. Author(s)
9342 (i.J. Almekinders
9343 E.R. van Dam and
W.H. Haemers
9344 H. Carlsson and
S. Dasgupta
9345 F. van der Plceg and
A.L. Bovenberg
9346 J.P.C Blanc and
RD. van der Mei
9347 J.P.C. Blanc
9348 R.M.W.1. Beetsma and
F. van der Plceg
9349 A. tiimunuvils
9350 R.C. Douven and
1.C. Engwerda
9351 F. Vella and
M. Verbeek
9352 C. Meghir and
G. Weber
9353 V. Feltkamp
9354 R.J. de Grouf and
M.A. van 'f'uijl
9355 Z. Yang
9356 E. van Damme and
S. Hurkens
9357 W. Giith and B. Peleg
9358 V. Bhaskar
9359 F. Vella and M. Verbeek
9360 W.B. van den Hout and
J.P.C. Blanc
Title
Theories on the Scope for Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
Eigenvalues and the Diameter of Graphs
Noise-Proof Equilibria in Signaling Games
Environmental Policy, Public Goods and the Marginal Cost
of Public Funds
The Power-series Algorithm Applied to Polling Systems with
a Dormant Server
Performance Analysis and Optimilation with the Power-
series Algorithm
Intramarginal Interventions, Bands and the Pattern of EMS
Exchange Rate Distributions
Intcrcolwrt I Ictcrogcncity and Optimnl Six:ial Insurancc Systans
Is There Room for Convergence in the E.C.?
Estimating and Interpreting Models with Endogenous
Treatment Effects: The Relationship Between Competing
Estimators of the Union Impact on Wages
Intertemporal Non-separability or Borrowing Restrictions? A
Disaggregate Analysis Using the US CEX Panel
Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and
Banzhaf Values
Aspects of Goods Market Integration. A Two-Country-Two
-Sector Analysis
A Simplicial Algorithm for Computing Robust Stationary Points
of a Continuous Function on the Unit Simplex
Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing
On Ring Formation In Auctions
Neutral Stability [n Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
Estimating and Testing Simultaneous Equation Panel Data
Models with Censored Endogenous Variables
The Power-Series Algorithm Extended to the BMAP~PH~I QueueNo. Author(s)





9365 F. van der Ploeg and
A. L. Bovenberg
9366 M. Pradhan
9367 H.G. Blcemen and
A. Kapteyn
9368 M.R. Baye, D. Kovenock
and C.G. de Vries
9369 T. van de Klundert and
S. Smulders









9375 E. van Damme
9376 P.M. Kort
9377 A. L. Bovenberg
and F. van der Plceg
9378 F. Thuijsman, B. Peleg,
M. Amitai 8r. A. Shmida
Title
An (s,q) Inventory Model with Stochastic and Interrelated Lead
Times
A Closer Look at Economic Psychology
On the Connectedness of the Set of Constrained Equilibria
A Note on "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a
Repeated Game"
Direct Crowding Out, Optimal Taxation and Pollution Abatement
Sector Participation in Labour Supply Models: Preferences or
Rationing?
The Estimation of Utility Consistent Labor Supply Models by
Means of Simulated Scores
The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R~ 2:
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates
The Welfare ConsequencesofDifferent RegimesofOligopolistic
Competition in a Growing Economy with Firm-Specific
Knowledge
Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope
Altemating-Move Preplays and vN - M Stable Sets in Two
Person Strategic Form Games
Voters' Power in Indirect Voting Systems with Political Parties:
the Square Root Effect
Pollution Abatement and Long-term Growth
Marginal Equivalence in v-Spherical Models
Evolutionary Game Theory
Pollution Control and the Dynamics of the Firm: the Effects of
Market Based Instruments on Optimal Firm Investments
Optimal Taxation, Public Goods and Environmental Policy with
Involuntary Unemployment
Automata, Matching and Fotaging Behavior of Bees
9379 A. I.ejour and I I. Vertxm Capital Mobility and Social Insurance in an Integrnted MarkclIIIVI~Y~IÍ IIflNI~IN ~NNIII